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Abstract This paper approaches the choice between the open and closed nuclear
fuel cycles as a matter of intergenerational justice, by revealing the value conﬂicts
in the production of nuclear energy. The closed fuel cycle improve sustainability in
terms of the supply certainty of uranium and involves less long-term radiological
risks and proliferation concerns. However, it compromises short-term public health
and safety and security, due to the separation of plutonium. The trade-offs in nuclear
energy are reducible to a chief trade-off between the present and the future. To what
extent should we take care of our produced nuclear waste and to what extent should
we accept additional risks to the present generation, in order to diminish the
exposure of future generation to those risks? The advocates of the open fuel cycle
should explain why they are willing to transfer all the risks for a very long period of
time (200,000 years) to future generations. In addition, supporters of the closed fuel
cycle should underpin their acceptance of additional risks to the present generation
and make the actual reduction of risk to the future plausible.
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Theworldwideneedforenergyisgrowing.TheInternationalEnergyAgencyforesees
a 60% increase in energy need in the world between 2004 and 2030 and most of this
expansion is expected to be met by fossil fuel [1]. Fossil fuels are not an attractive
option, however, for reasons concerning the availability of resources and climate
change. An increased need for alternative energy sources is therefore expected in the
upcomingdecades,e.g.windenergy,solarenergy,butalsonuclearenergy.Afterbeing
ruled out in many countries following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, nuclear energy
has recently made a serious comeback in the public and political debates about the
future of energy. Many peopleconsidernuclear energyatleastasaserious alternative
for the transition period between fossil fuels and sustainable energy sources.
According to the World Nuclear Association, there were 435 operative nuclear
reactorsinJanuary2007;TheUnitedStates,France,JapanandRussiatogetherpossess
the vast majority of the operative reactors producing 370 GWe. As a whole, nuclear
energy provides almost 16% of worldwide energy supply [2, 3].
The main advantage of nuclear energy—compared to fossil fuels—is its
capability of producing a large amount of energy with relatively small amounts
of fuel and a very small production of greenhouse gases. However, nuclear energy
has serious drawbacks, such as accident risks, security concerns, proliferation
threats, and nuclear waste. The waste problem is perhaps the Achilles’ heel of
nuclear energy as it remains radiotoxic for thousands of years [4].
Discussions about nuclear waste management must be related to the production of
nuclear energy, as the most hazardous waste is produced during energy production.
The question guiding this paper is whether spent fuel
1 is to be disposed of directly or
to be reused in the fuel cycle, referred to as the open and closed fuel cycle,
respectively [5]. This issue is still topical after more than four decades of widely
deployment of nuclear energy. In an open fuel cycle, uranium is irradiated once and
the spent fuel is considered as waste to be disposed of directly. This waste remains
radiotoxic for approximately 200,000 years; the period in which the radiotoxicity of
spent fuel will equal that of the amount of natural uranium used to produce the fuel.
Radiotoxicity is deﬁned as the biological impact of radioactive nuclides on human
health, in case they are digested or inhaled; these effects are indicated in sievert (Sv)
or millisieverts (mSv). The closed fuel cycle reuses spent fuel after irradiation to
produce energy and diminishes its toxicity and volume substantially. This fuel cycle
has many long-term beneﬁts, but it also creates extra short-term risks.
The question rises here how to deal with spent fuel in a proper way, taking the
needs and interests of this generation and future generations into account. We
should not foreclose options for future generations and should manage the waste in a
such way that ‘‘will not impose undue burdens on future generations’’ [6, 7]. In this
paper we approach ‘‘undue burdens’’ in the light of fuel cycles and propose
intergenerational justice as a framework in order to choose between the fuel cycle:
are we willing to transfer all risks of spent fuel to future generations, or do we ﬁnd it
1 For the sake of consistency, we here refer to the irradiated fuel in a nuclear reactor as spent fuel rather
than waste.
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123more just to diminish risks and hazards of our waste to the maximum extent and
accept, consequently, some additional risks to the present generation. We discuss
the idea of having right towards future generation and the concept of intergener-
ational justice. We further present the two fuel cycles and identify the associated
risks with these fuel cycles. In the following chapter, we focus on conﬂicting values
in choosing between them and reduce all trade-offs to a chief trade-off between the
present and future generations. The next chapter provides a few underlying
assumptions and possible counter-arguments.
Whether nuclear energy is desirable or indispensable as an energy source in the
future is a controversial issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper. At the same
time, applying nuclear energy through different fuel cycles raises a number of ethical
concerns and moral dilemmas; on those issues we focus here. Moreover, the existing
spent fuel all around the world is an urgent problem that needs to be dealt with.
280,000 tons of spent fuel had been discharged globally by the end of 2004, of which
one-thirdhasbeenrecycled,leaving190,000 tonsofspentfuelstored;thegrowthrate
isestimatedon10,500 tonsayear [8,9].Thechoicebetweenthe openandclosedfuel
cycle hassigniﬁcantinﬂuenceonthis growth.These intergenerational discussions are
also crucial for the future of research investments on waste management issues.
Partitioningandtransmutation(P&T)isanewtechnologyforfurtherdiminishingthe
waste radiotoxicity. P&T is still in its infancy and needs serious investments to be
furtherdeveloped[10,11];theseinvestmentarejustiﬁedifandonlyifonechoosesthe
closed fuel cycle, of which the P&T could be considered as an extension.
Future Rights, Present Obligations: Intergenerational Justice
Increasing concerns about depleting the Earth’s resources and damaging the
environment have invoked a new debate on justice across generations or
intergenerational justice. This concept of justice was ﬁrst introduced by John
Rawls in 1971 as intergenerational distributive justice, which stands for an equal
allocation of social beneﬁts and burdens [12]. Justice for future implies that today’s
people have obligations towards their descendants [13, 14] and these obligations
entail certain rights for the future [15–17]. These assumed rights have been
challenged by some philosophers: ‘‘…the ascription of rights is probably to be made
to actual persons—not possible persons’’ [18] and non-existing future people cannot
be said to have rights, as our action and inaction deﬁne their composition and
identity [19]; this is referred to as the Derek Parﬁt’s ‘non-identity-problem’. Other
objections against these alleged rights are expressed as the inability to predict future
properly, the ignorance of the need and desire for future as well as the contingent
nature of future. There have been a variety of arguments provided in the literature to
these objections
2 [20–23]: William Grey has proposed ‘‘impersonal principles
2 For an extensive discussion on future obligations and rights, see Justice Between Age Groups and
Generations, ed. Laslett and Fishkin, Sharder-Frechette’s Environmental justice Creating Equality,
Reclaiming Democracy, Avner de-Shalit’s Why Posterity Matters, Environmental policy and future
Generations and Justice, Posterity and the Environment, ed. Beckerman and Pasek (all mentioned in the
bibliography).
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123subject to retroactive person-affecting constraints’’ [24] and Wilfred Beckerman has
argued that we should provide future people with the minimum opportunity for a
‘‘decent and civilised society’’ [25].
Although these fundamental discussions about right and obligation towards
future people are very relevant, in this paper we will focus on the application of
these assumed future rights to environmental policy and more speciﬁcally nuclear
waste. In the last decades the climate change has given rise to serious concerns for
the future [26, 27]. Do we have a duty to future generations [21, chap. 5] and if so
what does this duty entail [28] and how should we realize it [29]?
Anticipating technological progress in a rapidly developing world and being
concerned about future generations, the World Commission of Environment and
Development introduced the concept of sustainable development in 1987. This
moment designates the introduction of intergenerational concerns in environmental
policy. This Brundtland deﬁnition—named after commission’s chairperson—states
that the key to sustainable development is an equitable sharing of beneﬁts and
burdens between generations ‘‘[…] that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’’ [30]. The
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in
1992 (Earth Summit) not only endorsed this concept of sustainable development
formally among 178 national governments, it also explicitly included the concept of
equity in its principles [31, Principle 3].
The sustainability principle implies that there is a conﬂict of interest between the
present and future generations. In an anthology edited by Andrew Dobson, the
concept of sustainable development is evaluated in the light of intergenerational
justice [32]. Wilfred Beckerman believes that the problems future people encounter
have existed for millennia and states that our main obligation towards future people
is ‘‘moving towards just institution and a ‘decent’ society’’, which encompasses
future generations as well [33, p. 91]. Brian Barry investigates whether sustain-
ability is a ‘‘necessary or a sufﬁcient condition of intergenerational distributive
justice’’. Barry emphasizes the obligations we have towards future generations and
says that ‘‘measures intended to improve the prospects of future generations […]d o
not represent optional benevolence on our part but are demanded by elementary
considerations of justice’’ [34, 35]
3. Bryan Norton perceives of sustainability as ‘‘an
obligation not to diminish the opportunity of future generations to achieve well-
being at least equal to their predecessors.’’ He further presents a model in order to
compare well-being across time [36]. The ‘‘contested meaning of sustainability’’ in
technology is comprehensively discussed by Aidan Davison [37].
What does the forgoing discussion about rights and obligations entail for nuclear
fuel cycles, considering the fact that spent fuel life-time concerns a period between
1,000 and 200,000 years? The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA
4) introduces
sustainability in one of its studies [11]. In this paper we adapt this deﬁnition both
conceptually and practically and introduce intergenerational justice as a framework
3 First published in Theoria in 1997 and 2 years later in Dobson’s anthology Fairness and Futurity.
4 NEA is a specialized agency of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development).
180 B. Taebi, J. L. Kloosterman
123to choose between the fuel cycles. Intergenerational concerns have already been
expressed about nuclear waste [38–40], but mainly with respect to the choice for
ﬁnal disposal of long living radioactive waste.
Nuclear Fuel Cycles: Open and Close
The characteristic difference in the fuel cycles is how spent fuel is dealt with after
irradiation. Two main approaches to spent fuel outline the main dissimilarity
between these cycles: (1) the direct isolation of the material from the environment
for a long period of time in which it remains radiotoxic and (2) ‘destroying’ or
converting the very long-lived radionuclides to shorter lived material [5]. The ﬁrst
approach represents the open fuel cycle in the production of energy. The closed fuel
cycle is in accordance with the second approach. Here below we will elaborate on
these two fuel cycles.
Open Fuel Cycle (OFC): Once-through Option
In the OFC, the lesser isotope of uranium (
235U) is ﬁssioned—split—in light water
reactors (LWR) to produce energy; 90% of all operative nuclear reactors to
produce energy are LWRs. Natural uranium contains two main isotopes, which
constitute
235U and
238U. Only the ﬁrst isotope (
235U) is ﬁssile and is used in
LWRs as fuel, but it only constitutes 0.7% of natural uranium. This low
concentration is not sufﬁcient in nuclear reactors, the concentration of
235Ui s
therefore deliberately enhanced to a minimum of 3% through a process called
uranium enrichment [4].
Irradiating uranium produces other materials, including plutonium (
239Pu),
which is a very long-lived radioactive isotope. Apart from plutonium-239, other
ﬁssile and non-ﬁssile plutonium isotopes as well as minor actinides will be formed
during irradiation. Actinides are elements with similar chemical properties:
uranium and plutonium are the major constituents in spent fuel and are called
major actinides; neptunium (Np), americium (Am), and curium (Cm) are produced
in much smaller quantities and are called minor actinides. The presence of
actinides in spent fuel deﬁnes the radiotoxicity and waste life-time. The OFC is
also called the once-through strategy, as the spent fuel does not undergo any
further treatment.
The spent nuclear fuel in an OFC will be disposed of underground for
200,000 years. This waste life-time in an OFC is dominated by plutonium. Neither
minor actinides nor ﬁssion products have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on long-term
radiotoxicity of waste in an OFC. Figure 1 illustrates these radiotoxicities. The
dashed line represents spent fuel in an OFC, decaying to the ore level in
approximately 200,000 years. Fission products are a mixture of various radionuc-
lides that will decay to the uranium ore level after approximately 300 years [41],
indicated by the dotted line in Fig. 1.
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As stated above, less than 1% of the uranium ore consists of the ﬁssile isotope
235U.
The major isotope of uranium (
238U) is non-ﬁssile and needs to be converted to a
ﬁssile material for energy production: plutonium (
239Pu). Spent fuel could undergo a
chemical treatment to separate ﬁssionable elements including Pu, this is referred to
as reprocessing. During reprocessing, uranium and plutonium in the spent fuel are
isolated and recovered. Recycled uranium could either be added to the front-end of
the fuel cycle or used to produce mixed oxide fuel (MOX), a mixture of uranium-
oxide and plutonium-oxide that can be applied in nuclear reactors as a fuel [42] (see
Fig. 2). Reprocessing is also called the ‘‘washing machine’’ for nuclear fuel. The
irradiated fuel is ‘‘washed and cleaned’’ and ‘‘clean’’ materials (U + Pu) are
reinserted into the fuel cycle to produce more energy, while the ‘‘dirt’’ is left behind
(ﬁssion products and minor actinides) to be disposed of as high level waste (HLW)
[4]. HLW contains ﬁssion products and minor actinides and will be put into a glass
matrix in order to immobilize it and make it suitable for transportation, storage and
disposal. This process is called conditioning of waste and results in so-called
vitriﬁed waste [6]. The ultimate radiotoxicity of vitriﬁed waste will decrease to the
uranium level in approximately 5,000 years [41], as illustrated by the dashed–dotted
line in Fig. 1.
As uranium and plutonium are separated and reused, this fuel cycle is called the
closed fuel cycle. The choice for a CFC is rightly associated with the choice to
recycle spent fuel. Figure 2 illustrates various steps in both nuclear fuel cycles and
their different interpretations of spent fuel. As can be seen in Fig. 2, the solid line
representing the OFC is a once-through line. The CFC on the contrary is illustrated




































































Fig. 1 Radiotoxicity of spent fuel, vitriﬁed waste (HLW) and ﬁssion products, compared with regard to
the radiotoxicity of uranium ore needed to manufacture the fuel
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123represented by the dashed lines. Nowadays, the main objective of reprocessing is to
use uranium more efﬁciently and to reduce the waste volume and its toxicity
considerably.
In the CFC, one can distinguish between two options with respect to nuclear
reactors. In the ﬁrst option, conventional LWRs are used, which are capable of using
MOX as fuel. Reprocessed spent fuel is returned to the fuel cycle as MOX. Spent
MOX fuel could again be reprocessed to separate uranium and plutonium. Further
recycling of plutonium is only possible in another type of reactor capable of
handling non-ﬁssile plutonium: fast reactors, which constitute the second option. In
the second option, the latter are basically used as energy producing reactors, in
which MOX is the fuel. Due to the fast neutrons, fast reactors are capable of using
the major isotope of uranium (
238U) to the maximum extent via conversion to
239Pu
[43].
The Future of the Closed Fuel Cycle; Maximal Recycling
As spent fuel is conceived of as the Achilles’ heel of nuclear energy, there have
been serious attempts to further reduce its radiotoxicity and volume. A new method
is partitioning and transmutation (P&T), which could be considered as a recent
supplementary method to reprocessing. Spent fuel comprises uranium and
plutonium, minor actinides and ﬁssion products. Uranium and plutonium are
separated during reprocessing in order to reuse; P&T focuses on ‘‘destroying’’ minor
actinides in spent fuel. If completely successful, P&T is expected to reduce the
volume and radiotoxicity of spent fuel one hundred times (compared to OFC). After
P&T, fuel radiotoxicity would decay to a non-hazardous level in 500 to 1,000 years
[10]. The waste stream would then only consist of relatively short-lived ﬁssion
products and curium isotopes. The latter will dominate the waste life-time and are
considered to be too hazardous to be recycled at reasonable expenses and risks. P&T
Fuel fabrication  
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Nuclear reactor  
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Fig. 2 An overview of the open and closed nuclear fuel cycle; the solid lines represent the OFC, the
dashed lines the CFC
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123is merely available at the laboratory level at the moment; a considerable amount of
R&D efforts is needed, before P&T could be utilized industrially [10, 11].
Waste Management, Interim Storage, Long-term Storage and Repositories
Irrespective of the fuel cycle choice, the remaining waste in a nuclear reactor after
the (optional) treatments needs to be disposed. In waste management, a distinction is
made between storage and disposal: storage means keeping the waste in engineered
facilities aboveground or at some ten of meters depth underground, while disposal is
the isolation and emplacement of the waste at signiﬁcant depth (a few hundreds of
meters) underground in engineered facilities, called ‘geological repositories’.
Until now, all the available storage facilities for spent fuel and high level waste
have typically been above ground or at very shallow depth. Spent fuel is mostly
stored under water for at least 3–5 years after removal from the reactor core; this
stage is called interim storage. Water serves as radiation shielding and cooling ﬂuid
[39]. Bunn argued that interim storage for a period of 30–50 years has become an
implicit consensus, as the world’s reprocessing capacity is much less than globally
spent fuel generation. In addition, there are no ﬁnal repositories at our disposal yet.
Interim storage of waste is also a crucial element in the safe management of
radiotoxic waste since waste should be stored to allow radioactive decay to reduce
the level of radiation and heat generation before ﬁnal disposal. For the countries that
favor reprocessing, spent fuel remains available for some decades to be reprocessed
and there is no need to build up vast stockpiles of separated plutonium after
reprocessing. For countries supporting direct disposal of spent fuel, interim storage
allows more time to analyze and develop geological repositories appropriately [44].
A commonly proposed alternative to geological disposal is the long term
monitored storage on the surface. Spent fuel remains in this case retrievable in the
future. However, the technical community appears largely to disregard this option
and considers the surface storage only as an interim measure until the waste can be
disposed of in geological repositories [5, 38, 39, 45]. Deep oceans and outer space
are mentioned as possible locations for ﬁnal disposal as well, but there are
substantial political, ethical as well as technical impediments, mainly related to the
safety of these locations [5].
Risks and Associated Values
In this paper we distinguish moral values at play in the production of nuclear
energy. Values are what one tries to achieve and strives for, as we consider them
valuable; moral values refer to a good life and a good society. However, we should
not confuse them with people’s personal interest; moral values are general
convictions and beliefs that people consider as worth striving for, in public interest
[46]. We further identify dilemmas and moral problems rising from conﬂicting
values: some trade-offs need to be made in order to choose a fuel cycle. The three
main values we distinguished are as follows: sustainability, public health and safety
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sake of comparison, relate them to risks and beneﬁts of the open and closed fuel
cycle.
We here distinguish between short-term and long-term effects, in which we
consider the upcoming 50 years as short-term and after that as long-term. This
period is chosen in view of comparisons in the literature between the fuel cycles:
strong views about maintaining the OFC are mainly about the coming ﬁve decades
[47] and in economic comparisons, short-term is deﬁned as 50 years [48], probably
based on estimations of reasonably assured uranium sources for the coming ﬁve to
six decades in 2002 [49]. To conclude, 50 years is the period in which supply
certainty of the OFC is assured. However, as will be shown later on, this period can
be extended to 85 years or more without invalidating the arguments and conclusions
of this paper.
Sustainability: Supply Certainty, Environmental Friendliness and Cost
Affordability
A comparative study of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) on various P&T
technologies introduces the following three axes in order to assess sustainability: (1)
resource efﬁciency (2) environmental friendliness and (3) cost effectiveness [11]. In
this paper we take these axes as a guideline for understanding sustainability with
respect to nuclear energy and follow an adapted version in terms of concepts and
terminology, with regard to the fuel cycles.
Supply Certainty
On the ﬁrst axis, sustainability refers to the continued availability of uranium: NEA
uses the term resource efﬁciency for this. In this paper we apply the term supply
certainty instead. Deploying resources efﬁciently means that we aspire to use as less
as possible resources for the same purpose, while supply certainty refers to
availability of resources in order to fulﬁll the needs. In energy discussion, certainty
is a more signiﬁcant concept than efﬁciency. Although this difference in designation
has no consequences for the factual comparison in availability of uranium, we prefer
the conceptually correct term.
As there are 50–60 years of reasonably assured uranium resources [49], there will
be no signiﬁcant short-term inﬂuences of the fuel cycle on the supply certainty.
Later estimations of the NEA and the IAEA
5 present approximately 85 years of
reasonably assured resources (RAR) uranium are available for a once-through
option in a LWR. These institutions estimate that this amount sufﬁces for
2,500 years in a CFC, based on a pure fast reactor cycle, which is an improvement
5 The International Atomic and Energy Agency (IAEA) is the World’s central intergovernmental forum
for scientiﬁc and technical cooperation in nuclear ﬁeld. IAEA is a specialized agency of the United
Nations.
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adjust this period to 5,000–6,000 years, assuming that fast breeders allow
essentially all non-ﬁssile
238U to be bred to
239Pu in order to be used as fuel [8,
51]. It needs to be mentioned that these estimations are made under the explicit
assumptions that fast breeders will be broadly deployed in the future.
The supply certainty beneﬁts of the CFC will be relevant in the long run.
Although there are no short-term signiﬁcant differences between the fuel cycles,
countries without natural fossil fuel, like Japan and France, tend to opt for
reprocessing and recycling [52].
Environmental Friendliness: Radiological Risks to the Environment
The second axis of the OECD approach in specifying sustainability concerns
environmental friendliness. This value depends on the accompanying radiological
risks to the environment. Radiological risks, as we perceive them in this paper,
express the possibility or rather probability that spent fuel leaks to the biosphere and
can harm both people and the environment.
The NEA proposes three stages to assess radiological risks: (1) mining and
milling, (2) power production, and (3) reprocessing. They compare the radiological
risks of the OFC with the (once) recycled and reused MOX fuel. In the power
production phase, NEA argues, there is no difference between the cycles. The main
difference lies in the two other steps: mining and milling and reprocessing. They
further argue that deployment of reprocessing decreases the need for enriched
uranium and, therefore, natural uranium, of which the mining and milling involve
the same radiological risks as reprocessing and reusing plutonium as MOX fuel. In
fact, NEA argues that under the described circumstances there are equal radiological
risks for both fuel cycles [53]. This argument is probably sound in the long run, for
large scale reprocessing enterprises and under ideal circumstances, but one can
wonder whether the factual short-term consequences are such that radiological risks
of both fuel cycles are quite similar. The question remains whether we should take
comparisons under ideal circumstances or factual consequences into consideration
(in moral discussions). Furthermore, NEA completely neglects the distribution of
beneﬁts and burdens: building a reprocessing plant in France will increase local
risks to the surrounding area and will diminish the burdens in a uranium-exporting
country, such as Canada.
NEA further neglects the risks and hazards associated with the transport of waste
in case of reprocessing: ‘‘…[R]adiological impacts of transportation are small
compared to the total impact and to the dominant stage of the fuel cycle’’ [53]. If we
consider different aspects of public perception of risk, we cannot retain the idea that
radiological risks of nuclear waste transportation are negligibly small [54]. Only a
few reprocessing plants are currently available around the world and spent fuel
needs to be transported to those plants and back to the country of origin. In Great-
Britain, for instance, a serious debate is currently taking place about the possibilities
to return Japanese reprocessed spent fuel to Japan.
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investments needed to build the plants; small countries with a few nuclear power
plants and in favor of the CFC will probably not build a reprocessing plant and will
keep transporting spent fuel to those countries capable of this technology. To
illustrate, The Netherlands is one of the countries with favorable reprocessing
policy: Dutch spent fuel is currently transported to La Hague (France). There is no
real chance that The Netherlands will build its own reprocessing plant in the coming
years. To conclude, we assume that reprocessing will result in more short-term
radiological risks, both to the environment and to the public health and safety, as
illustrated in Fig. 3.
The short-term and long-term effects mentioned above also pertain to environ-
mental friendliness. Using the fuel to the maximum extent and maximally recycling
the spent fuel could be considered as long-term ‘environmentally friendly’, as the
environment is less exposed to potential radiological risks and radiotoxicity in the
long run. One of the main arguments in favor of reprocessing—along with enhanced
resource efﬁciency—is the vast reduction of waste volume and its toxicity and the
accompanying advantages from a sustainability point of view. The volume of each
ton of spent fuel containing approximately 1.5 m
3 of HLW could be reduced
through reprocessing three times [55]. The waste toxicity will decrease at least with
a factor three [52].
Affordability
The third axis the NEA proposes in its comparison is cost effectiveness. We adapt
this axis here into affordability. We acknowledge the relevance of economic aspects
for initiation and continuing a technological activity. Sustainability can be
conceived of as durability, to that purpose. However, economic effectiveness goes
much further than the question whether an activity is reasonably durable or
 Supply  certainty   
Radiological risks  
to environment  
Affordability  
Radiological  
risks to public  
Proliferation  
  Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long 
Open  + - + - + - + - + -   
Closed  +  + - + - + - + - +   
Sustainability   Public Health & Safety  Security 
Fig. 3 Ethical values (ﬁrst row) and their speciﬁcation (second row) related to the OFC and CFC. A plus
sign represent an improvement of the ethical value and has a positive connotation, a minus sign is a
drawback of the value
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consider that as a duty of the state with respect to its citizens; nevertheless, it is
supposed to be neither economically effective nor proﬁtable.
It is also arguable whether durability should be accepted as sustainability. This is
an ongoing debate about different interpretations of the notion of sustainability. In a
moral discussion, it is probably more just to separate economic considerations from
other aspect of sustainability. However, for the sake of our analysis we follow here
NEA’s analysis and accept sustainability conceived as durability.
In 1994, a NEA study determined a slight cost difference between the
reprocessing option and direct disposal. Based on best estimates and the uranium
prices of that time, the cost of direct disposal was approximately 10% lower, which
was considered to be insigniﬁcant, taking the cost uncertainties into account [56].
However, considering later uranium prices and resource estimations, there is a
strong economic preference for the once-through strategy, even if a considerable
growth of nuclear energy production is anticipated [52]. A MIT study in 2003 on
‘The Future of Nuclear power’ upholds the same view on economic aspects of
reprocessing. Deutch et al. conclude in this report that—under certain assumptions
and the US conditions—the CFC will be four times as expensive as the OFC. The
once-through option could only be competitive to recycling if the uranium prices
increase [47]. These MIT researchers are not susceptible to the counterarguments
that disposing of reprocessed HLW will be less expensive. They furthermore present
a cost model in which reprocessing remains uneconomic, even if the cost of
reprocessed HLW were zero [47]. Another international study compares reprocess-
ing with the once-through option and concludes that—even with substantial growth
in nuclear power—the open LWR fuel cycle is likely to remain signiﬁcantly cheaper
than recycling in either LWRs (as MOX) or fast breeders for at least the next
50 years [48].
In the previous reasoning we considered reprocessing as a broadly applied
technology, which will create the need to build new reprocessing plants. Economic
affordability appear totally different if we base our analysis on the existing
reprocessing plants, as many small consumers of nuclear energy reprocess their
spent fuel in France or Great-Britain. These countries do not have excessive initial
expenditures for their CFC.
Public Health and Safety: Short-term and Long-term Radiological Risks
The second value is public health and safety. We again distinguish between short-
term and long-term radiological risks, which cause hazards to public health and
safety. Recycling of plutonium as MOX diminishes the eventual radiotoxicity of
spent fuel with a factor three, assuming that spent MOX fuel is disposed of after one
use (also called once-through recycling
6). Theoretically, multiple recycling of
plutonium in fast reactors can decrease the long term radiotoxicity of disposed waste
6 Not to be confused with the once-through option or the OFC.
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several decades [52].
Recycling spent fuel includes the separation and storage of plutonium. Along
with security arguments which will be discussed later, plutonium contains serious
potential risks to the public health due to its exceptional toxic nature. Plutonium
needs especial isolation from humans, as it contains long-lived alpha emitters,
which are very radiotoxic upon inhalation [57, p. 113)]. We included these risks in
the short-term radiological risk for waste treatment. With respect to long-term
radiological risks, the same reasoning as for the previously mentioned sustainability
holds true: the short-term radiological risks associated with the CFC are
signiﬁcantly higher than the OFC.
Security and Proliferation Hazards
The last, but certainly not least value at play in waste management is security as a
result of production of plutonium during recycling. Concerns regarding nuclear
weapon proliferation are extremely relevant given the current state of world security.
Proliferation threats rise either by the use of enriched uranium (up to 70%) or by the
production or separationof plutonium. To illustrate, eight kilograms of weapon grade
plutonium (
239Pu) are sufﬁcient to produce a Nagasaki-type bomb [58].
Proliferation is also a potential hazard in countries capable of enriching uranium.
One of the main tasks of the IAEA is to annually report to the United Nation’s
Security Council about nuclear energy possessing nations. Although both the OFC
and the CFC need enriched uranium in the reactor, the short-term proliferation
concerns of the CFC are considerably higher, due to the separation of plutonium
during reprocessing.
The security concerns are double-edged: reprocessing increases proliferation
concerns for the contemporary people, but at the same time it decreases those
concerns for future generations, since the spent fuel residuals contain no plutonium
any more. One can argue that the potential proliferation concerns of direct disposal
of spent fuel in the OFC are negligible compared to the actual security concerns in
case of reprocessing: disposed spent fuel cannot be retrieved unnoted, and expensive
and inaccessible reprocessing plants are needed to separate plutonium from it for
weapon manufacturing. Some scholars argue, on the other hand, that spent fuel in
geological repositories becomes a better weapon-grade material as time goes by,
due to the natural enrichment of
239Pu [10]. However, this effect will take place in
several thousands of years. In sum, the CFC involves more short-term proliferation
and security concerns but decreases those concerns in the long run, as illustrated in
Fig. 3.
Value Conﬂicts in Fuel Cycles and Future Generations
In the preceding analysis, we formulated a number of values and aimed to translate
risks and beneﬁts of the fuel cycles into these values. In decision-making about the
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mentioned that the plus and minus signs in Fig. 3 are merely approximations which
enable us to make a comparison between the OFC and CFC, these signs are neither
quantitative measures nor absolute entities. It should further be mentioned that
plusses represent an improvement in terms of the three basic values, illustrated in
squares on top of Fig. 3; minuses are drawbacks of these values.
Value Conﬂicts
In choosing between options, we have to accept certain trade-offs between these
basic values. The CFC enhances sustainability in terms of supply certainty and
creates less radiological risks to the environment. It also diminishes public health
and safety concerns, as well as security concerns in the long run. At the same time,
however, the CFC involves more short-term additional risks and, therefore,
compromises public health and safety as well as security of contemporary people. It
also deteriorates short-term sustainability, perceived as environmental friendliness.
Trading off these conﬂicting values in a certain way can help one choose one of the
fuel cycles. To illustrate, if one holds the cleanness of the environment we bequeath
to our descendants as most important, she should be willing to accept some
additional risks to the public in the present and, therefore, the CFC would appear the
obvious choice. Short-term risks are traded off against the long-term beneﬁts in the
CFC. Another example: if one considers proliferation threats in the current security
state of the world highly unacceptable, she trades off long-term beneﬁts of the CFC
against the short-term beneﬁts of the OFC; the latter will be the outcome of this
trade-off.
In the literature, implicit trade-offs are made. A MIT study in 2003 concluded
unambiguously that the once-through fuel cycle is the best choice for the US for at
least 50 years. MIT researchers asserted that the reprocessing plants in Europe,
Russia, and Japan involve unwarranted proliferation risks and did not believe that
beneﬁts of the CFC outweigh the safety, environmental and security risks as well as
economic costs [47]. Von Hippel upheld the same view on reprocessing:
proliferation and economic costs of reprocessing are high and the environmental
beneﬁts are questionable. He maintained that direct storage of spent fuel after
irradiation is cheaper, safer and more environmentally benign than reprocessing
[59].
Proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the main concerns in the discussions
about recycling nuclear waste. IAEA director El-Baradei noted in 2004: ‘‘We should
consider limitations on the production of new nuclear material through enrichment
and reprocessing, possibly by agreeing to restrict these operations to being
exclusively under multinational control’’ [60]. Proliferation concerns with respect to
reprocessing are the main reason why many countries prefer the OFC. The US,
Sweden, Finland, and Canada have chosen the OFC to avoid plutonium separation.
But unlike these countries, reprocessing occurs in many European countries such as
Great-Britain and France as well as smaller nuclear energy consumers like The
Netherlands, that reprocesses its nuclear waste in the French plants in La Hague.
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the US global nuclear energy partnership (GNEP) and the Russian Federation’s
global nuclear power infrastructure initiatives [8].
Intergenerational Justice and Nuclear Waste Management
One of the key principles of radioactive waste management laid down by the IAEA
in 1995 is that it should be managed in such a way that it ‘‘will not impose undue
burdens on future generations’’ [6]. This principle is founded on ethical
consideration that the generation enjoying the beneﬁts of an undertaking should
manage the resulting waste. The NEA supported this deﬁnition in the same year in a
collective opinion [7].
As illustrated, the CFC mostly has long-term beneﬁts and compromises public
health and safety as well as security of the contemporary people. Does the aim to
avoid ‘‘undue burdens on future generations’’ mean that we are supposed to
diminish waste radiotoxicity and its volume as much as possible? To what extent
should we accept the increased risks and hazards to the present generation in order
to accomplish the latter?
The questions how to interpret the ‘‘undue burden’’ can best be understood within
the framework of intergenerational justice. Especially in fundamental policy
decision-making, the question rises how one generation could equitably take the
interest of future generations into account. Serious discussions about this issue
started in the US [61] and are still ongoing in nuclear communities in choosing
between options for ﬁnal disposal of waste [38, 39]. Some scholars interpreted the
NEA collective opinion in 1995 as a conﬁrmation for the—once and for all—sealed
underground repositories. Uncertainty in long-term safety and possible future needs
to recover plutonium (from spent fuel) for its potential energy value are two serious
objections to permanently closed repositories [62]; we are after all required not to
deprive future generations of any signiﬁcant option [6, 7]. Inequity of risks and
beneﬁts across generations are two other reasons opposing permanent disposal [63].
In other words, scholars argue that permanent disposal forecloses options to future
generations to retrieve and reverse waste. Alternatives to permanent disposal are
long-term continued surface storage or phased repositories, which remain open for
an extended period of time. There seems to be consensus among nuclear experts that
disposal in repositories should be given preference above surface storage, as it is
believed to be a passively safe solution that does not require burden of care by
future generations [38].
In a recent European study, Schneider et al. argue that the main concerns in risk
governance are the transfer of a whole waste management system, including a safety
heritage, from the present to the future generations [64]. They approach various
technical and societal issues, such as long-term responsibility, justice and
democracy from the perspective of generations, both across generations and within
one generation.
In this paper we propose to reduce the trade-offs in choosing the fuel cycle to a
chief trade-off between the present and the future. Is it legitimate and just to transfer
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an equitable transfer of the whole waste management system—as argued by
Schneider et al.—to the future? Or is it more just and equitable to handle our waste
as much as possible, in order to diminish its risks in the far future?
The OFC is to be associated with short-term beneﬁts and the CFC primarily has
long-term beneﬁts
7. In this reasoning, accepting the CFC means that we intend to
diminish the risks and hazards to the future and accept some additional risks for the
present generation. The OFC transfers the risks as much as possible to the future and
avoid those risks in the present.
Underlying Assumptions and Possible Counter-arguments
So far we have argued that decision-making on the fuel cycles could best take place
within the framework of intergenerational justice. This conclusion is based on the
analysis in the foregoing chapter, in which we illustrated the choice between the
OFC and the CFC mainly as a choice between the present and future generations.
Obviously, there are a few assumptions at the basis of this analysis. Below, we will
discuss some of these underlying assumptions and provide some possible counter-
arguments and evaluate their validity.
Deﬁning Short-term as 50 years
In our analysis, we deﬁned short-term as 50 years. Beyond half a century we
considered as long-term. The question that rises here is whether 50 years constitute
the real turning point in comparing the speciﬁed values, as we introduced in Fig. 3.
And more importantly, will other distinctions in time spans between short and long-
term change our conclusion? As we mentioned earlier, the period of 50 years was
taken from the comparisons we found in the literature. Most scholars preferring the
OFC, pronounce their strong opinion for the coming ﬁve decades and economic
comparisons are made for this period of time [47, 48]. Both mentioned studies based
their strong opinion on estimations of reasonably assured uranium resources at the
beginning of this century; NEA and IAEA considered this amount in 2001 enough
for 50–60 years [49]. This period is, however, extended to 85 years in the 2005
estimations (of IAEA and NEA). It needs to be mentioned that the bulk of this
increase is not due to discovering more resources, but it is a result of re-evaluation
of previous resources in the light of the effects of higher uranium prices [50].
Looking at the ﬁrst columns in Fig. 3 (supply certainty), the long-term beneﬁts of
the CFC will not change if we take 85 years as a turning point, the long-term
beneﬁts of supply certainty in the CFC will come into practice after this period. We
should mention here that we founded our analysis on the identiﬁed resources. The
total undiscovered resources of uranium are expected to be signiﬁcantly higher [50].
7 One exception to this trade-off is supply certainty that shows no signiﬁcant difference between the fuel
cycles.
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vanish entirely, even for a much longer period of time. However, an analysis based
on undiscovered resources comprises such an amount of uncertainty that estimations
are practically meaningless.
Whether the column affordability will change, if we consider short-term as being
85 years, is not clear. We can state that high initial investments for the reprocessing
plant might perhaps be affordable, if we consider a longer period of time. However,
there have been no serious estimations based on the announced reasonably assured
uranium resources in 2005.
All Released Pu will Eventually be ‘Destroyed’
Beneﬁcial long-term radiological risks of the CFC are based on the assumption that
all plutonium is separated from spent fuel and ‘‘destroyed’’. As plutonium is the
dominant element in indicating the waste life-time in spent fuel, its extraction from
waste will diminishes waste radiotoxicity substantially. The mentioned period of
radiotoxicity of vitriﬁed waste after reprocessing of 5,000 years [41], includes the
assumption of complete consumption of plutonium after separation. Less long-term
proliferation hazards in the CFC are also based on the same assumption: extracted
plutonium is ultimately ﬁssioned. How realistic is this assumption if we consider the
millions of kilograms weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriches uranium (to
above 70%) discharged as a result of dismantlement of warheads after the Cold
War?
These released materials could also either be considered as waste to be disposed
of directly or as potential fuel for the production of energy. These different points of
view mark the divergent approaches between the two superpowers in the Cold War.
Americans believe that excess plutonium has no economic value, as it costs more to
use as energy source than the energy is worth. However, since the other option of
dealing with this hazardous material, i.e. its disposal, is costly as well, some
plutonium is supposed to be used as reactor fuel (MOX), but only in a once-through
scenario. This is perfectly in line with the American concerns about (civilian)
plutonium which is not recycled and reused either. Russians hold a totally different
view on this issue: they consider excess weapon plutonium as fuel having
‘‘signiﬁcant energy potentials’’. Russia also acts in accordance with their CFC
perspectives. However, they believe—together with Americans—that the potential
value of these plutonium stockpiles cannot be cashed in the near future, as it needs
substantial additional costs [58].
Plutonium has already proven its beneﬁt in the production of energy.
Reprocessed plutonium from civil reactors is called civilian plutonium, a name
that could mistakenly be understood as unfeasible weapon material (although it is
very unfavorable as a weapon material). As reprocessing of plutonium has outpaced
its use as fuel and due to technical and regulatory restrictions, no more than 30% of
produced MOX could be ﬁssioned in a reactor, which creates an imbalance
between separated civil plutonium and reused MOX; in the beginning of this
century an estimated amount of 200 tons of civilian plutonium was available in the
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amount of released weapon plutonium soon. Referring to the theft concern and
concerns on excessive surpluses of plutonium, mainly in former Soviet Union
countries, Bunn et al. argue for an international phased-in moratorium on
reprocessing [58, 65].
Irrespective of Bunn’s reasoning’s validity regarding nuclear theft, we can easily
state that separated plutonium for the purpose of reprocessing contains more
proliferation concerns than plutonium ‘embedded’ in spent fuel. The latter needs
advanced and very expensive technology to separate plutonium, which is not
accessible outside the legal authorized and controlled way of the IAEA, which
supports the argument that separated plutonium involves more security and
proliferation concerns.
A similar reasoning holds true for the toxic properties of plutonium. If we extract
plutonium from spent fuel, under the assumption that it will eventually be ﬁssioned
and, consequently, prevent it of being disposed of underground, we create de facto
more risks for the contemporary people. These risks were already included as more
short-term radiological risks in Fig. 3. However, if we fail to make it plausible that
extracted plutonium will eventually be ﬁssioned in reactors as MOX, we merely
create more risks—both short-term and long-term—and that will substantially
change our analysis. Considering the fact that one-third of separated plutonium is
currently ﬁssioned through reprocessing, the long-term beneﬁts of the CFC will
merely be meaningful under the assumption that MOX consumption will
substantially expand.
The latter is possible under two scenarios: (1) broader deployment of MOX fuel
and (2) less reprocessing, as produced MOX could ﬁrst be consumed. Less
deployment of reprocessing conﬂicts with the initial assumption. We were trying to
give underpinnings for long-term beneﬁts of the CFC, of which reprocessing is a
crucial component. That leaves the ﬁrst scenario open: less long-term risks of the
CFC are plausible if and only if we take a wider deployment of MOX fuel for
granted, either as a result of adapting existing reactors or due to a broader
application of MOX in the planned reactors or reactors being built. According to
the World Nuclear Association, there are 28 new reactors being built and 64 are
ordered or planned worldwide. Furthermore, there are 158 reactors proposed and
waiting for funding or approval [2]. These developments can give support to the
long-term beneﬁts of the CFC. Still, the protagonists need to make plausible that the
stockpiles of civilian plutonium extracted through reprocessing will eventually be
ﬁssioned.
How Long does the ‘Long-term’ Last in Case of Radiological Risks?
Let’s go back to the ﬁrst assumption discussed with respect to deﬁned time spans in
order to distinguish between the short-term and long-term. So far, we argued that the
CFC has less long-term radiological risks, assuming that separated plutonium in
reprocessing will eventually be ﬁssioned. However, these radiological beneﬁts will
be noticeable only after 5,000 years, which represents the waste life-time of
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risks to both public and the environment (at that moment), the more so since
reprocessing will be an ongoing business in the CFC.
The question raises here whether this challenges our analysis. The trade-offs
needs still to be made between the short-term and long-term radiological risks. The
CFC is rightly associated with less long-term risks: perceived from now or after
50 years, there will be less long-term risks in remote future. The analysis is still
valid, but these long-term beneﬁts will reveal after a much longer period of time
than the proposed 50 years for supply certainty. To sum up, 50 years is not
applicable to all comparisons, but the line of analysis will not change as a
consequence.
The CFC and the Transition Period
Let’s now take a look at the argument of nuclear energy being used in a transition
period between conventional fuel resources (fossil fuel) and sustainable energy,
from the perspective of the CFC. As we stated earlier, based on the 2004 nuclear
energy consumption, the uranium resources are available for a period of
approximately 85 years for a once-through option in a LWR [50]. There is also
no economic reason for deployment of the CFC in the upcoming 50 years, as it
remains uneconomic for this ‘‘short’’ period of time and the high initial investments
cannot be recovered, even if a considerable growth of nuclear energy is anticipated
[47, 48, 52]. So far we argued that the beneﬁts of the CFC will be revealed in the
long run only, certainly in no less than 50 years. If this time exceeds the transition
period, should those who believe in nuclear energy to bridge the transition period,
be consequentially in favor of the OFC?
This transition period is not accurately deﬁned in the literature; it concerns the
transition of fossil fuel to sustainable energy sources. Nuclear energy is believed to
play a signiﬁcant part into this transition until 2020, due to its assured supply
certainty and low emissions [66]. Which role nuclear energy will play after this
period depends on developments in tackling safety, waste and proliferation issues.
Most advocates of the transition-period argument do not exclude nuclear energy:
they believe that nuclear energy is capable of being sustainable in the future, if the
afore-mentioned concerns are being taken care of [66].
If we agree that the CFC is—under some assumptions—more environmentally
benign in the long run and if the latter is the outcome of our trade-offs, we can
argue that we should use the CFC for the transition period, no matter how short or
how long this period is. The long-term burdens as a result of nuclear energy
deployment will be there anyway, the CFC enables one to diminish those burdens
to some extent. There are also no technical restrictions to deployment of the CFC
in short periods of time, except the time needed to build a reprocessing plant.
However, the argument we presented with respect to actually destroying
plutonium holds stronger if one is in favor of applying nuclear energy to bridge
a transition period: within that same period, all plutonium should then be
destroyed.
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In our analysis we presented two different methods in the production of nuclear
energy. Prior to our analysis, we stated that the questions with respect to desirability
of nuclear energy will be beyond the scope of our paper. We also listed the state-of-
the-art in the production of nuclear energy, being responsible for 16% of world’s
energy production, and focused on existing moral conﬂicts. Under these assump-
tions, there are two methods to produce nuclear energy, namely the OFC and the
CFC.
The question raises here whether there will be a third fundamentally different
option, or in other words, whether the choice between the OFC and the CFC is a
false dilemma? Future developments of nuclear energy mainly concern effort to
reduce radiotoxicity of waste, such as the P&T presented in this paper. These
options are to be considered as an extended CFC and are not essentially different.
We still need to deal with the trade-offs as we described in this paper.
One can further argue that the framework of intergenerational justice can give
rise to unacceptable risks in both scenarios. In other words, the intergenerational
justice framework refutes both nuclear fuel cycles. Such reasoning challenge the
assumptions we made with regard to nuclear energy rather than our analysis based
on those assumptions.
Why do not we Talk about Justice Among Contemporaries?
In the preceding chapters we argued that the choice for a fuel cycle should be made
within the framework of intergenerational justice. In other words, we should (also)
take the needs and interest of future generations into consideration and make a
trade-offs between the latter and the interest of contemporary people, in order to
make a decision on the fuel cycle. The question rises here: is that a sufﬁcient
condition? Especially when we consider that the majority of nuclear plants is
located in developed countries, while more than 30% of the world’s uranium
production is coming from developing countries [50]. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Namibia, and Niger that are bearing the burdens of the front-end of the fuel cycle
(i.e. milling, mining, etc.) do not have a power plant at all and will not be able to
share the beneﬁts of nuclear energy? Is not this a relevant question, perceived from
distributive justice?
The authors fully acknowledge the relevance of evaluating justice among
contemporaries in this discussion, which is referred to in the literature as
intragenerational justice. However, intragenerational considerations are not deci-
sive in the choice for the fuel cycle, they rather follow from the choice one makes.
To illustrate, when a country decides to deploy the CFC, the question rises where
the country is going to reprocess its waste; is it just that Dutch waste—for
instance—goes to La Hague in France to be reprocessed? These intergenerational
justice considerations are also relevant within a country: is it just that the Nevadans
bear the burden of the whole American waste which probably will be disposed off
under the Yucca Mountains in Nevada. Similar considerations are to be made in
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while the whole nation enjoys the beneﬁts.
As we brieﬂy showed here, intragenerational considerations rather challenge the
assumption we made in the beginning of this paper with regard to the deployment of
nuclear energy, than to help us to make a choice between the fuel cycles.
Intergenerational justice, however, offers a suitable framework for choosing the fuel
cycle. Once this choice is made, intragenerational concerns are born.
Conclusions
In this paper we evaluate NEA’s deﬁnition for sustainability [11] and adapt that
deﬁnition both conceptually and practically: it is questionable—from a moral
standpoint—whether sustainability can be related to economic issues and it is more
correct to use economic affordability instead of cost effectiveness. We further argue
that though sustainability—as deﬁned by NEA and adapted here—is a crucial aspect
in this discussion, it does not offer a proper basis to choose a fuel cycle: public
health and safety as well as security concerns are at least as important to be
included. By adding a time dimension to this comparison, we propose a new
framework in order to choose the nuclear fuel cycle—intergenerational justice—and
specify consequences of both fuel cycles within this new framework. To that
purpose, we identify values at play and value conﬂicts one encounters in choosing
between the fuel cycles: the CFC improves sustainability in terms of the availability
of fuel and involves less radiological risks to the public and the environment in the
long run, but it compromises public health and safety in the present. The CFC also
poses serious security threats for the contemporary people, due to the production
and the separation of plutonium. However, at the same time it diminishes those
threats for future generations.
These trade-offs in nuclear energy are reducible to a chief trade-off between the
present and the future. To what extent should we recycle our produced nuclear
waste in order to avoid ‘‘undue burdens’’ on the future and to what extent should we
accept additional risks for the present generation? These questions can be answered
within the proposed framework of intergenerational justice. This concept of justice
is often used in the nuclear discussions, mainly to tackle issues with respect to ﬁnal
waste disposal, waste retrievability in the future and, more recently, risk governance
with regard to the question how we can equitably transfer a whole waste
management system to the future.
In our analysis we used lots of estimations with regard to uranium resources,
waste radiotoxicity and the radiological risks of the waste. How valid are these
estimations if we include the uncertainties encompassing our analysis? Estimations
and predictions are the key problems in dealing with the future, especially when we
talk about the remote future. These uncertainties need to be further investigated in
future studies in order to test the validity of provided analysis. It is also
recommendable to quantify the probabilities of these risks in order to compare them
in a more appropriate way. Do the decreased risks to the public and the environment
in the remote future equal the increased risks to the present generation?
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perspective of intergenerational justice. Advocates of he OFC should argue why
they are willing to transfer all the risks for a very long period of time
(200,000 years) to future generations and accept all the accompanying uncertainties
for their descendants. Supporters of the CFC should underpin their acceptance of
additional risks to the present generation. More importantly, they should make it
plausible that separated plutonium during reprocessing is eventually ‘‘destroyed’’.
Proliferation remains the leitmotiv in these discussions, as it is the main objection
against the CFC.
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